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TOWARD CREATING A POLICY OF PERMANENCE
FOR AMERICA'S DISPOSABLE CHILDREN:
THE EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL FOSTER CARE
FUNDING STATUTES FROM 1961 TO PRESENT
Deborah L. Sanders*
INTRODUCTION
The formulation of clear national goals for children in foster care has
been constrained by a limited awareness concerning the harmful effects of
long-term foster care on children and of childhood development in general.
The federal foster care funding laws emerged during a time when the notion
of child-centered laws was itself taking shape, and originally were perhaps
overshadowed by the more pressing social goals of securing civil liberties
for the poor and minorities. With this in mind, the effectiveness of federal
foster care funding laws should be measured both against our nation's in-
complete understanding of children's developmental needs and the social
conditions that existed prior to each incremental shift in the law.
Indeed, federal laws addressing the needs of children in foster care
only made their first appearance in a 1961 welfare provision (the "1961
Act"), which offered funding to state agencies to care for children whose
parents were unable to and allowed those children to enter into foster care.'
This 1961 provision, although seemingly innocuous, failed to design a
mechanism for moving children out of foster care, and caused what would
come to be known as "foster care drift."2 At the height of the national foster
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who have stood over me like beacons: Professor Robert F. Williams, Judge Joseph M. Nardi, and Professor
James Muldoon. Professor Williams's tireless dedication, guidance, and enthusiastic support for this project
helped me to accept that the work is never done. He has given me the belief that my contribution matters. I
also thank the Honorable Joseph M. Nardi for his efforts on behalf of abused and neglected children which
inspired this work and illuminated my path. My deepest thanks to Professor Muldoon for teaching me how to
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1. Act of May 8, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-31, 75 Stat. 75 (1961).
2. David J. Herring, Inclusion of the Reasonable Efforts Requirement in the Termination of Parental
Rights Statutes: Punishing the Child for the Failures of the State Child Welfare System, 54 U. Pi'r. L. REV.
139, 158 (1992) [hereinafter Inclusion].
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care failure, before the passage of the 1980 Child Welfare Act, nearly
400,000 children had fallen into to the abyss created by the 1961 Act.
The 1980 Child Welfare Act4 attempted to remedy the one direc-
tional flow of children into the foster care system that resulted from the pas-
sage of the 1961 law through a provision that provided funding to states for
children in foster care upon the condition that state agencies make "reason-
able efforts" to avoid removal or to reunify families if removal was initially
found to be necessary.' The congressional desire to care for foster care chil-
dren and to preserve families represented a social retraction of expanded
adult liberties in the decades before the passage of the 1980 Act, and also
indicated a retrenchment into more conservative family ideals. Underneath
the 1980 statute's intention to facilitate reunification or to avoid removal
was a newly articulated goal of securing permanency in placement solutions
for children in foster care. This goal was, and continues to be, supported by
child experts as essential to childhood well being; however, the means for
achieving permanence through foster care funding has since changed.
With the passage of the 1997 Adoption and Safe Families Act
("ASFA"),6 foster care funding laws have shifted the emphasis from family
preservation to child safety with the intention of assuring permanency for
children with the understanding that such a shift may mean giving up on par-
ents. Despite the change in emphasis from preservation to child safety, the
goal of permanence in foster care, whether through reunification efforts or
more timely adoptions, has endured and continues to take shape as we be-
come aware of the needs of children in general and the impact of these laws
on children in foster care.7
Even with Congress's best intentions, modifications to the federal
foster care funding laws still fail to keep pace with the law's unanticipated,
harmful effects. Much of Congress's inability to project these negative ef-
fects resulted from the same limitations of knowledge that originally com-
pelled the development of foster care funding laws from the beginning. But
this is a limitation that must be expected while moving toward progress.
Other harmful effects, however, have resulted from the failure to harmonize
foster care laws with other laws that naturally intersect. Specifically, be-
3. S.REPNo.96-336,atll (1979).
4. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 96 Stat. 500 (1980).
5. Id. at § 471(a)(15).
6. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997).
7. See Encouraging Adoption: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Human Resources of the Comm. on
Ways and Means, i 05th Cong. 112 (1997) [hereinafter Encouraging Adoption Hearings] ("Permanency has a
variety of connotations including notions of stability with respect to the home where the child lives and his or
her relationship to caregivers. In the strictest sense, however, permanency refers to the place where the legal
relationship between the child and the caregiver is most secure.").
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cause foster care laws are no longer aligned with welfare reforms, these
laws, which were once unified now conflict. Congress must-continue to be
committed to reevaluating the impact of foster care funding legislation in
order to assure the best outcome for the nation's most vulnerable children.
This paper will analyze the creation and refinement of foster care
policy through three federal statutes: the 1961 Act, the 1980 Act, and ASFA.
These three statutes are progressive in their attempts to address problems
related to foster care that were socially imminent and emblematic of the time
periods and social attitudes from which they spawned.
The state of current foster care policy can best be viewed in light of
the most recent statute; thus, this paper will examine in detail the passage
and application of ASFA.8 This Act provides a framework for expediting the
processes by which a child in foster care proceeds from temporary emergent
care to a permanent placement solution. Operating through Social Security
Act funding, ASFA provides incentives to states whose successful imple-
mentations of key provisions of the Act result in increased adoptions of fos-
ter care children.
ASFA operates as a catalyst for foster care policy through its funding
mechanism,9 which creates a contract between the federal government and
states by providing benefits to states that "voluntarily and knowingly ac-
cept""° its terms. Thus, the rights of enforcement created between the federal
government, offering funds, and those states that accept them under such a
statute are typically confined to the terms of the agreement and therefore
"do[] not... confer an enforceable right upon the Act's beneficiaries."'" For
this reason, foster care policy, unlike other areas of the law, cannot be ex-
pected to develop through judicial interpretations of individual rights. In-
stead, development in foster care policy is reliant on legislative oversight
and political pressure for change. Such change can only be anticipated
where scrutiny by Congress is frequent and expectations are high.
Part I will examine the original foster care funding statute, the 1961
Act, which was intended to extend welfare subsidies to needy families where
the primary wage earner became unemployed. Through its provision for
8. The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 26 (1997) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
9. The conditioning of federal funds in exchange for states' compliance is affected by Congress using the
spending power of the Constitution and limits federal intervention to those aspects of the law related to the
states' agreement for accepting funds. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 1 ("Congress shall have Power to... provide
for the ... general welfare of the United States."). See also Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending
After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911 (1995).
10. Suter v. Artist, 503 U.S. 347, 357 (1991).
I. Id. See also Barbara L. Atwell, "A Lost Generation ": The Battle for Private Enforcement of the
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 593 (1992).
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funding dependent children in foster care and its lack of an incentive provi-
sion aimed at driving children out, the law assured lengthy stays for children
in foster care. The unintended effects of the 1961 Act created a need for
national goals and policies for foster care children and led to the passage of
the 1980 Child Welfare Act.
Part II will analyze the problems in society and foster care that
prompted the 1980 Act and will introduce the idea that the formulation of
foster care policy has paralleled our national consciousness concerning the
developmental needs of children. Specifically, this part will discuss the
creation of a federal policy for funding children in foster care, beginning
with the 1961 Act, by examining an expanding cultural and legislative desire
to cure existing inequalities in all aspects of society, including race and gen-
der. Part II will also discuss the formulation, goals, and mechanics of the
1980 Act. By viewing the 1980 Act as a response to the harms experienced
by children because of expanding adult freedoms, this part will also show
how the 1980 Act advanced foster care policy toward the goal of permanence
and will look at the growing emphasis on childhood well-being that inspired
the 1980 Act's requirement that state agencies use "reasonable efforts"' 2 ei-
ther to avoid placement, or to reunify families where placement was deemed
necessary 3 and which, through its frequently conflicted application created
the need for the final statute, the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997
(ASFA).
Part III will discuss the development of ASFA as it represents an in-
creasing social awareness concerning children's needs and of the failure of
the 1980 Act to achieve its ideal of family preservation. Looking at ASFA's
mechanics and potential, this part will show how ASFA embodies a more
clearly enunciated policy promoting child safety and permanence, a policy
that could only be possible through Congress's willingness to engage in re-
sponsible legislative reexamination of foster care.
Part IV will discuss both the projections and the impact of the 1997
ASFA legislation and present recommendations for continuing to sharpen
our national goals for children in foster care. This part will also discuss the
most recent legislation aimed at improving foster care, the Strengthening
Abuse and Neglect Courts Act of 2000.14 This legislation provides funding
for training judicial officers, agency staff, and court personnel to assure that
ASFA timelines can be met, for tracking children in the system, and for ex-
12. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, § 471(a)(15), 96 Stat. 500
(1980).
13. Id.
14. Strengthening Abuse and Neglect Courts Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-314, 114 Stat. 1266 (2000).
[Vol. 29:1
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panding volunteer advocate programs. Additionally, Part IV will recom-
mend that funding be provided to train foster care parents and other actors
within the foster care system in order to make the foster care experience it-
self more stable for children who must remain in care for extended periods.
Addressing the conflict of welfare reform laws and ASFA timelines for ter-
mination, Part IV will recommend that ASFA and welfare laws distinguish
between fit parents whose neglect is solely related to poverty and parents
who are actually unfit to care for their children. This distinction could help
Congress create an exception to welfare's new time restrictions for receiving
benefits and in keeping with ASFA and child welfare policy in general,
could sustain families that might be separated because of parents' inability to
provide essential needs such as food, clothing, childcare, and housing.
I. THE 1961 ACT: A NET IN SUPPORT OF UNEMPLOYED PARENTS AND A
TRAP FOR CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE
Congress's first federal foster care funding law, a nameless 1961 act,
was one early attempt by the Kennedy administration to initiate President
Kennedy's 1961 inaugural charge that the nation "bear the burden of a long
twilight struggle against common enemies of man: tyranny, poverty, disease,
and war."15 This desire to overcome the plight of the poor was in the politi-
cal forefront of the early Kennedy administration,' 6 perhaps because of con-
flicts created by a steady migration, beginning in the 1940's, of poor minori-
ties into American cities.' 7 Forced out of rural areas by an agricultural revo-
lution that replaced their skills with the advances of mechanization, many of
these displaced citizens became dependent on public assistance. As the
numbers of poor became centralized and more cohesive, and the poor of
"America's urban slums were no longer invisible,"18 the idea that poverty
was not part of the American experience became untenable.' 9 Along with
attention to the economic distress facing many minorities and the poor, the
15. WALTER I. TRATTNER, FROM POOR LAW TO WELFARE STATE: A HISTORY OF SOCIAL WELFARE IN
AMERICA 319 (1999).
16. Id. at 313 ("[President Kennedy] made poverty, unemployment, and hunger major themes for his
party's nomination.").
17. Id. at 314. Trattner here argues, "This tremendous upheaval caused a good deal of suffering," and
further notes that the social relief effort during the period from 1960 to 1970 doubled because of the "migra-
tion of large numbers of displaced farm workers to the ... nation's cities where ... relief was available to
them for the first time." Id. However, as Trattner indicates, others have argued that the increase in public
relief can be better attributed to the "increased political power of the mass black poor, who ... had to be
contended with in the nation's voting booths." Id. See, e.g., FRANCIS F. PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD,
REAFFIRMING THE REGULATION OF T14E POOR (1974).
18. TRATTNER, supra note 15, at 315.
19. Id.
2002]
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Civil Rights movement lent a voice to an otherwise unrecognized political
constituency.
The 1961 Act was one of President Kennedy's first responses to the
new voice of the mounting urban poor. This law expanded welfare entitle-
ments beyond women and children in homes without male wage earners to
families where the primary wage earner exhausted unemployment benefits."0
Providing aid to intact families advanced the scope of welfare's subsidies for
dependent children to include the idea of family hardship. This expansion
was certainly in keeping with social imperatives aimed at achieving some
degree of equality for the underrepresented. One of the most illustrative
changes to welfare law brought about by the passage of the 1961 Act was the
provision that officially changed the title of the program, now commonly
referred to as welfare, from "aid to dependent children" ("ADC") to "aid to
families with dependent children" ("AFDC").21 However, this change was
more symbolic than legally significant. While the 1961 Act went beyond its
predecessor, which addressed only the needs of single women and children
living in abject poverty,22 because states were not required to adopt the pro-
gram, and many refused, the potential for this law to do any good was sig-
nificantly undercut.23
Although the 1961 Act explicitly aimed to impact social welfare pol-
icy, the statute's aims for children in foster care were more understated; it,
nevertheless, shaped social policy regarding foster care in a meaningful way.
The 1961 Act's stated purpose was to "authorize ... financial participation
in aid to dependent children of unemployed parents, and for other pur-
poses."2 Funding for children in foster care was one of those other pur-
poses, making benefits available to children whose parents qualified for
AFDC, and who, because of abuse or neglect, needed to be placed outside of
their home.25 Despite the lack of emphasis placed on children in foster care
in the 1961 Act's purpose, the effects of the funding were enormous, primar-
20. S. REP. NO. 87-165 (1961) ("These programs afford a base capable of being expanded to include
families in which the breadwinner is unemployed, if the States wish to expand them.").
21. Id. (emphasis added).
22. For a discussion on the laws preceding the 1961 Act, see JOEL F. HANDLER, THE POVERTY OF
WELFARE REFORM 23-29 (1995). ADC was primarily enacted to assure that poor single women could con-
tinue to raise their children. Inspired by a movement in the late nineteenth century by the "Child Savers" to
address the needs of children of poor women by providing funding that would allow families to stay together,
Congress passed one of the first Aid to Dependent Children statutes in 1911. States followed with similar
statutes, popularly known as "mothers pensions" because they allowed poor single mothers to stay at home
and raise their children. The most common starting point for referencing the beginning of welfare, however, is
usually the passage of the Social Security Act under New Deal Legislation.
23. Id.
24. Act of May 8, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-31, 75 Stat. 75 (1961) (emphasis added).
25. Id.
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ily because funding was aimed at sustaining children in care and not at mov-
ing children out of the foster care system. Thus, the statute, with its lack of
direction and funded influx of children into foster care, virtually assured the
swell of children captured in the foster care net before the passage of the
1980 Child Welfare Act.
II. THE 1980 ADOPTION ASSISTANCE AND CHILD WELFARE ACT:
A SHIFT TOWARD PERMANENCY THROUGH FAMILY PRESERVATION
AND REUNIFICATION
The passage of the 1980 Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act
reflected a shift in the policies concerning the needs of children in the foster
care system.2 6 The original foster care funding provisions in the 1961 Act
simply created a funding source to states for children in foster care whose
families would have otherwise been eligible for AFDC money.27 The 1980
Act sought to create a disincentive for lengthy foster care stays by condition-
ing federal reimbursement for foster care maintenance payments upon a
showing that state agencies had made reasonable efforts prior to the place-
ment of a child in foster care, "to prevent the removal of the child from his
home"28 and "to make it possible for a child to return home.
29
In addition to foster care reimbursement payments, the 1980 Act
provided adoption assistance funds to potential adoptive parents to encour-
age permanency where placement was determined to be necessary, and re-
unification was deemed inappropriate. 30 The shift in policy can be defined as
a move away from merely attempting to remedy inequalities by providing
money to sustain children in the foster care system, to an emphasis on pre-
venting the need for foster care in the first place or where removal was nec-
essary, to provide services for the purposes of reunification.
Much of this shift in policy can be attributed to an evolving con-
sciousness about children's needs in general.3' While the 1961 legislation
26. S. REP. No. 96-336, at 1 (1979) (According to the Senate Report, the 1980 Act makes an overt shift in
emphasis by refashioning "the incentive structure of present law [which] is modified to lesson the emphasis on
foster care placement and to encourage greater efforts to find permanent homes for children either by making
it possible for them to return to their own families or by placing them in adoptive homes.").
27. Act of May 8, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-31, §§ 407-408 (1961), 75 Stat. 75 (1961) (The 1961 Act ex-
panded the definition of a dependant child for the purposes of AFDC funding to include a child who would
meet the requirements of AFDC "except for his removal ... as a result of a judicial determination to the effect
that continuation therein would be contrary to the welfare of such child ... who received aid under [a] state
plan in or for the month in which court proceedings leading to such a determination were initiated.").
28. S. REP No. 96-336, at 2, 3 (1979).
29. Id.
30. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (1980).
31. See MICHAEL A. NEFF, PERMANENCY PLANNING, ASFA AND BEST PRACTICES: A HANDBOOK FOR
CASEWORKERS 4 (2000) ("The civil rights, feminist and other movements of the 1960's gave rise ... to the
'children's liberation movement."'). "Recognition of a 'right to treatment' for such persons under institutional
2002]
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had its genesis during a period of social liberation, with its focus on social
equality,3 2 the 1980 Act was born during a period of reflection about the ef-
fects of adult liberties on the well being of our children. Therefore, while
the 1961 legislation was intended to address poverty in the spirit of AFDC
by supplying an income source to needy families,33 it did not reflect a phi-
losophy about long-term arrangements for children in foster care.34 Indeed,
the Senate Report for the 1961 Act stated that the purpose of the bill was to
"assist children who are in need because of the unemployment of a parent..
. [or because of] death, absence, or incapacity of a parent.,35  Unemployed
parents were the main focus of the 1961 Act, whereas children in foster care
were so obliquely referenced-captured in the "incapacity of a parent" lan-
guage-in the Act's purpose statement that one might imagine that coverage
of children in foster care was an afterthought.36
Unlike the 1961 Act whose emphasis was on curing economic ineq-
uities created by social imbalances, the 1980 Act clearly reflects a strong
awareness about the needs of children in foster care. Specifically, the 1980
Act declared as its goal the ideal of securing a permanent placement solution
for children in foster care.37 Through the 1980 Act, Congress intended to
achieve permanence through the use of services that would bolster family
stability, thereby either preventing the need for removal, or if removal was
deemed necessary, preparing the family for a child's eventual return.38
control as mental patients, prisoners and others led the movement for children's rights to coin a new concept: a
'right to permanency."' Id. at 5.
32. The Civil Rights and Woman's Movements both reflect a period of expanding notions of entitlement
for minorities and women. Additionally, many other aspects of traditional cultural values were being called
into question during the 1960's such that scrutiny of social equities was arguably more possible in this era than
had been the case previously.
33. See TRATrNER, supra note 15, at 315. Some would argue, though, that extending aid to unemployed
wage earners was less an expansive representation of policies aimed at creating equality and instead repre-
sented a political palliative. Tratmer summarizes the arguments of Francis Piven and Richard Cloward, whose
work Regulating the Poor asserted that the increase in eligible recipients was not the cause of increased wel-
fare roles; rather, the expansion of relief was a crafted response to political pressure and urban violence.
"Rather than deal with the real poverty-producing factors-racial discrimination and structural unemploy-
ment-the administration chose to give these people money in an effort to pacify them." Id.
34. S. REP. No. 87-165, at 1 (1961). Funding children in foster care, according to the Senate report, was
contrary to the overall objective of the Aid to Dependent Children Program, whose goal it was to "provide
cash assistance for needy children in their own homes," however, the foster care provision was in keeping with
the general goals of curing economic injustice by assuring that "lack of financial resources [would not] hinder
the development of the most suitable care for children who have to be cared for outside their own home." Id at
6 (emphasis added).
35. Id. at 1 (emphasis added). It is significant that this act is aimed at providing funds for children "who
are in need because of the unemployment of a parent," with the provision for children in foster care captured
in the less precise language of"incapacity of a parent," and perhaps as something of an afterthought. Id.
36. Act ofMay 8, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-31, 75 Stat. 75 (1961).
37. S. REP No. 96-336, at 12 (1979). "[Tlhe committee believes that it would be appropriate and desir-
able at this time to modify the law in a way which will de-emphasize the use of foster care and encourage
greater efforts to place children in permanent homes." Id.
38: The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 26 (1997) (codified as
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Congressional awareness of children's need for permanence during
the development of the 1980 Act was surely influenced by the growing ten-
sion between what had been an expanding concept of adult social freedoms
in the 1960's and a growing body of childhood studies39 in the 1970's that
began to expose the impact of these new family constructs on children.4"
Thus, while no-fault divorce laws continued to expand the rights of adults in
the 1970' S, 4 1 many child psychologists and other experts, by this time, began
to question the effects of such freedoms on a child's need for stability and
constancy.42 Despite whatever blame might be leveled against a loosening
society for the harms that adult freedoms caused its children, it might be
argued that the social revolutions of the 1960's and 1970's also permitted a
similar revolution on behalf of children since a model of cultural uprising
had already been established.43 The problem became one of balancing the
competing interests of dependent children with their newly liberated parents.
One of the legal responses to the tension created by weighing the
rights of adults against the needs of children was the creation of the "best
interests of the child" standard.44 This standard began the move away from
an earlier inquiry based upon which parent had the right to custody after di-
vorce and attempted instead to make paramount the rights of the dependent
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). ASFA requires "a plan of services which will be provided in
order to improve family conditions and facilitate returning the child to his home, or which will facilitate other
permanent placement of a child... " The key mechanism for implementing the policy of permanence in the
1980 Act was the reasonable efforts provision which intended that the use of services would translate into such
reasonable efforts "made prior to placement of the child in foster care to prevent or eliminate the need for
removal of the child from his home; and ... to make it possible for the child to return to his home." See S.
REP. No. 96-336, at 3. The important emphasis here is on preservation of the family.
39. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 199-200 (The Free Press
1979). "Scientific findings reinforce our conviction that ... it is essential to provide [children] with continuity
of both affectionate (emotional) care and cognitive stimulation." Id. at 201.
40. Id. The authors begin the rumblings of the arguments that become foundational to the foster care
statutes, claiming that the notion that children have an endless capacity to adapt and to sustain disruptions of
their environment is dangerous to children. They also claim that the false belief that a child's "cognitive
resilience will protect him from, and enable him to overcome, earlier environmental deprivations, disruptions
and losses, [is a] false reductionism assumption." This claim becomes a prophetic warning when looking at
the evolution in standards for foster care placement. ASFA confirms what these authors suspected in 1979.
Specifically, they warned that "misplaced expectations [about the ability of children to adapt] have encouraged
parents and policy makers to be too undemanding about standards of daycare or alternate arrangements for
young children."
41. D. KELLY WEISBERG AND SUSAN F. APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 567
(1998). In 1973, the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act introduced a clause for no-fault separation with a
waiting period of 180 days before a divorce could be granted.
42. See generally JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1973),
BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1979) and THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1996). The work
of Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert Solnit established a standard for both establishing guidelines for
custody disputes and for laying a framework for the appropriate point of intervention for states where abuse
and neglect are the issues. This work has culminated in the well-known trilogy.
43. NEFF, supra note 31, at 4.
44. Robert H. Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 233 (1975).
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child.45 In adopting the best interests of the child as a legal standard, legisla-
tors began to inject a new ideology into the legal climate. In this new era,
parents were free to exercise their newly won liberties, but courts applied the
best interests of the child standard intending not to impose those liberties
upon their children.
Nowhere was this shift more evident than in divorce proceedings
where applying the best interests of the child standard in most jurisdictions
meant that before a custody determination could be made parents had to be
evaluated according to a list of factors46 in order to determine parental fit-
ness. 47  This approach replaced two earlier gender-dependent presumptions
used by courts to determine which parent would be awarded custody: the
paternal preference which operated before the mid-nineteenth century,48 and
the maternal preference, known as the "tender years doctrine,, 49 which oper-
ated from the mid-nineteenth century until being replaced by the gender-
neutral best interests of the child standard in the 1970's. Both of the earlier
approaches, the paternal preference and the tender years doctrine, made con-
clusions about the care of children based on societal presumptions of adult
gender roles, and in doing so focused long-term child care on adults rather
than on children. ° Yet, even if the conclusion was flawed in its presumption
that one sex was more competent in terms of caring for children than the
other, the tender years doctrine is important for our purposes because it
45. WEISBERG, supra note 41, at 805.
46. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 402 9A U.L.A. 147 (1987). Some of the factors consid-
ered in determining a child's best interests in custody actions include: "the wishes of the child as to his custo-
dian; the child's adjustment to his home, school and community; [and] the mental and physical health of all
individuals involved." Most jurisdictions still impose the best interest of the child standard, although much
current debate centers around the subjective nature ofjudicial interpretations of what constitutes best interests.
47. See Mnookin, supra note 44.
48. Mary Kate Kearney, The New Paradigm In Custody Law. Looking At Parents With A Loving Eye, 28
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 543, 546-51 (1984). Custody laws originate from English and Roman laws that ascribed certain
property-like rights of children to their fathers. Thus, before maternal preference in custody decisions, chil-
dren were treated as the property of their father for two reasons: first, children were regarded as property.
Second, women were not considered distinct legal entities; thus, they could not own property. English com-
mon law eventually gave way to notions of parental fitness; however, unless proven otherwise, a father was
presumed the natural guardian. Early American common law borrowed these basic principles from the com-
mon law of England, giving fathers both the "duty to support," and the consequential rights to children that
flowed from that duty.
49. Id. at 548. The Tender Years Doctrine expresses the notion that the needs of children "of tender
years" are better cared for by their mothers.
50. Id. (Many courts applying this standard articulated what could be viewed as an early version of the
best interests of the child standard by claiming that it was in the child's best interest at a young age to be cared
for by the mother. Other courts, however, expressed sympathy for the mother, claiming that when the "child is
very young, the courts are always loathe to deprive a mother of custody." This mixed approach may capture
the ambivalence of lawmakers to move away from adult rights toward children's needs. It may also reflect the
limited knowledge of courts and child specialists about what the best standard was in determining who should
have custody, and about what that determination should be based on. A close inspection of the holdings of
many "tender years" cases reveals the seeds of the "best interests of the child" standard, but it would be some
time before the child's interests were viewed as distinct from the parent's rights.).
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represents the notion that custody laws were becoming at least vaguely more
child-centered.
The significance of viewing the new child-centered trend through its
evolution in divorce and custody laws is that although the needs of children
in foster care were clearly not as visible as the needs of children in divorce
during this period, a focus on the needs of dependent children, rather than
their liberated parents, in divorce settings permitted a correlative shift in
focus on the needs of children in the foster care realm. Children in divorce
were visible because divorce laws could be seen as reflecting an undoing of
restrictive societal norms about marriage. Divorce laws-especially no-
fault divorce laws-in the 1970's were seen as progressive, and in many
ways, positive." Foster care, on the other hand, was seen as perhaps a socie-
tal unmentionable. In this way, laws addressing the needs of children in fos-
ter care could only hope to advance on the backs of more prominent social
changes regarding child development and child psychology.5 2 This is espe-
cially true about laws affecting children that played out in divorce proceed-
ings. Similar to the trend toward disregarding gender prescriptions of fitness
by applying the best interests of the child standard in divorce, lawmakers in
the 1980 Act can be seen as attempting to de-emphasize the rights of parents
and instead to focus on the best interests of children in the system. The 1980
Act was, therefore, laudable in its desire to articulate any legislative policy
concerning the well being of children in foster care, especially since the
original 1961 statute contemplated only the physical and economic needs of
children in foster care.53
Because conventional norms had given way to new ideas about fami-
lies and about children's needs within them during the twenty years before
the 1980 Act, the effects of such social changes on children could not be
immediately anticipated. By the time the 1980 Act was being considered,
experts and lawmakers began to calculate the social costs of not addressing
the collective losses to children lingering in perpetual states of familial un-
certainty.54 Most of the effects projected by child development specialists
51. See generally, BARBARA DAFOE WHITEHEAD, THE DIVORCE CULTURE (Alfred A. Knopf 1996).
52. See Encouraging Adoption: Hearing on H.R.-3 Before the Subcommittee on Ways and Means, 105th
Cong. 18 (1997) [hereinafter Encouraging Adoption Hearings] (Statement of Valora Washington, Program
Director, Families for Kids Initiative) (claiming that issues related to children in foster care "remain invisible"
while public awareness concerning children and adoption is centered on "a relatively few healthy, white in-
fants and toddlers who have been fought over in the courts by well-fixed nuclear families embroiled in cus-
tody disputes.").
53. NEFF, supra note 31, at 4. In a statement issued in 1969, before the formulation and passage of the
1980 Act, Joseph Reid, Executive Director of the Child Welfare League of America argued: "[W]e need an
educational campaign to establish the rights of the child as paramount, even above the rights of parents -
certainly equal to the rights of parents. There are no statutes that specifically state what a child is entitled to."
54. S. REP. No. 96-336 at 11 (1979).
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caused by lengthy foster care placements amounted to what such experts
described as problems with attachment capacity, security issues and dis-
rupted development in general.5 Along with the increased awareness of the
harms to children caused by long-term foster care, were the daunting figures
of how many children were expected to become trapped in the foster care
abyss. According to the Senate Report that accompanied the bill for the
1980 Act, then titled the "Social Services and Child Welfare Amendments of
1979," approximately 478,000 children were languishing in foster care as of
1977.56 While the majority of children, nearly 400,000, were in family foster
homes, the remaining 78,000 were in institutionalized settings. 7 Moreover,
in 1977 a child could expect to spend a median of two and one half years in
foster care, with thirty-eight percent of all children spending in excess if two
years.5
8
A. Goals of the 1980 Act
With discontinuity being the key protagonist in childhood develop-
ment concerns both in society and in the law, the 1980 Act was a logical
extension of a new ideal toward securing a permanent environment for chil-
dren in foster care. The 1961 Act had failed to establish a policy beyond the
intention to fund AFDC eligible children in foster care.5 9 In failing to articu-
late a policy, the 1961 Act had the undesired effect of assuring lengthy foster
care stays through the very funding that was intended to offer foster care
children an equal opportunity. Because the law provided no incentive for
moving children out of the system, foster care, under the 1961 Act, became a
last stop for many children.60
In addition to the problems created by the 1961 Act's failure to pro-
vide a mechanism that drove children out of foster care once they were ush-
ered in, social reluctance to terminate parental rights further assured lengthy
foster care stays because in order to honor the biological tie, courts needed to
deny children the formation of a prosthetic parental relationship.6 This con-
55. Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit, supra note 39. In their landmark book, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD, written in 1979, authors Goldstein, Freud and Solnit claim that unintended separations are "major
and irreparable," disrupting the child's "security and impair[ing] his ability to develop into a well-functioning
adult." Id. at 53.
56. S. REPNO. 96-336, at 11(1979).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Sheldon, supra note 59, at 78-79 ("Prior to the [1980] Act, the law placed little emphasis on the fam-
ily, except in the reluctance to terminate parental rights.").
60. See NEFF, supra note 31, at 4 ("[O]f 624 children who entered foster care in 1966, 227 or thirty-eight
percent remained in care after five years.").
61. Id. ("The paradigm governing foster care [in the 1960s] derived from natural rights of parents over
their children, of possession by procreation and inviolability of filial bonds, protected constitutionally as the
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flict was captured in the 1977 Supreme Court decision Smith v. Organiza-
tion of Families.62
In Smith, the Court denied that foster parents had a liberty interest in
the final dispositional determination of the children's placement; since the
goal of foster care, according to the Court, was to "prepare the child for his
return to his real parents or placement in a permanent adoptive home .... "'
The Court further asserted that prolonged care of a child by a foster care
family did not create "some sort of 'squatter's rights,"' and that a foster par-
ent's "mere subjective 'expectancy"' was not a liberty interest protected by
the Due Process Clause.6 Despite the Court's refusal to find that foster care
parents had a constitutionally protected interest in the disposition of the chil-
dren for whom they cared, the Court recognized the inherent conflict in most
foster care schemes. In recognizing this conflict, the Court observed that
"the warmer and more homelike environment of foster care is intended to be
its main advantage over institutional care, yet because ... foster care is in-
tended to be only temporary, foster parents are urged not to become too at-
tached."65
The Smith Court revealed a true discontinuity in the law's approach
before the 1980 Act, and captured a key reason for its development. Foster
care determinations, before the 1980 Act, were subject to a number of erro-
neous and conflicting policies that on the one hand held fast to the ideal of
parental autonomy and family unity and on the other responded to a desire to
make some safe alternative available through funding a child's shelter away
from home where a parent's care failed. The 1980 Act sought to bring what
had been undefined in foster care practices and policies into focus and to
create a plan that was more comprehensive than one that aspired only to pro-
viding the money needed to feed and clothe children. The 1980 Act was
novel in its attempt to create national goals for the future of children des-
tined for foster care. Indeed, the 1980 Act was most impressive in its formu-
lation of a legislative opinion concerning the effects of long-term institu-
tionalized care on children at all, and in its desire to respond to what the
Smith Court referred to as "rather persuasive, if still incomplete, evidence
that throughout the United States, children in foster care are experiencing
high rates of psychiatric disturbance., 66 The goals in the 1980 Act were to
'right of family integrity' and by limitations on terminating parental rights to only the most hopeless or dire of
circumstances.")
62. See431 U.S. 816 (1977).
63. Id. at 861.
64. Id. at 860.
65. Id. at 836 n.40.
66. Id.
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prevent a need for removal, rather than to supply matching funds once re-
moval was accomplished, as was the case in the 1961 Act, and to facilitate
early return if removal was necessary.67
The echoes of child psychologists urging permanency from a decade
past reverberate throughout the 1980 Act's legislative history, the statute
itself, and finally through the Act's proposed regulations. The Senate Re-
port, for example, expressed the committee's intention to "move children out
of foster care into more permanent situations ... back into their own fami-
lies or into adoptive homes .. 68 Where courts determined that adoption
or reunification was not possible, the report states that the committee in-
tended to provide funds to smaller homes of less than twenty-five children in
order to move children "from large, highly institutionalized private institu-
tions into smaller institutions which more nearly approximate the atmos-
phere of a home."69 In addition to the sentiments of committee members
encouraging permanency and reunification, the Department of Health and
Human Services proposed - but never adopted - regulations after passage
of the act that would have "prevent[ed] children from getting lost in the sys-
tem" by requiring states to provide services to "help enable children to stay
at home with their birth parents, [assist] families to get back together as soon
as possible . . . and [encourage] families to adopt children with special
needs. 7 °
B. Mechanics: The Reasonable Efforts Requirement
The 1980 Act incorporated Congress's goals of permanence and
shortened foster care stays by requiring state agencies to (1) make reasonable
efforts before placing a child in foster care; (2) prevent or eliminate the need
for removing the child from his home; (3) facilitate the return of the child to
his or her home if removal was deemed necessary; and (4) provide funding
for adoption assistance where the termination of parental rights is expected.7,
Congress expected state agencies to satisfy the reasonable efforts require-
ment with supplementary services to families with the hope of either pre-
venting removal or encouraging timely reunification.72 Although the statute
67. S. REP. No. 96-336 at 14 (1979) ("The committee agrees that it would be appropriate and desirable at
this time to modify the [1961] law in a way which will de-emphasize the use of foster care and encourage
greater efforts to place children in permanent homes.").
68. Id. at 14.
69. Id. at 16.
70. Implementing the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, 45 Fed. Reg. 83,172 (December 17,
1980).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (2000).
72. H.R. REP. No. 96-900 (1980). The report defines services as those services which supplement or
substitute for parental care and supervision for the purposes of "preventing or remedying or assisting in the
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did not define what constituted reasonable efforts, it is significant that a
House Committee report summarizing the bill listed the reasonable efforts
requirement as a new feature of existing law under the heading of "Preventa-
tive and Reunification Services. 73
The Act's case review system is the key mechanism for assuring that
states make reasonable efforts to prevent removal, or, where removal is nec-
essary, to reunify children with their families.74 The case review system was
intended to ensure that children receiving maintenance payments would be
evaluated for the appropriateness of their placement in foster care.75 Another
purpose of the case review system was to give proper care and services to
both the child and the child's parents in an effort to maximize the family's
potential for reunification (or, in the alternative, to facilitate a timely perma-
nent placement). 76 In addition to projections about a child's future after fos-
ter care, the case review system was intended to monitor the ongoing care
and appropriateness of a child's existing placement situation with the imme-
diate goal being that a child "achieve placement in the least restrictive (most
family like) setting. 77
The 1980 Act was unique in its provision for subsidizing adoptions
by authorizing federal matching payments to parents who adopted children
with special needs. 78 Under the 1980 Act, a child was defined as having spe-
cial needs if he could not be returned to the home of his parents or there ex-
isted a specific factor or condition (such as the child's ethnic background,
age, . . . membership in a minority group, or the presence of factors such as
medical,... physical, mental or emotional handicaps) because of which it is
reasonable to conclude that the child [could] not be placed with adoptive
parents without providing adoption assistance.79
Adoption assistance was key to progressing the 1980 Act beyond the
scope of its 1961 predecessor for two reasons. First, despite the Act's stated
preference for preserving families, the adoption assistance provision sup-
plied a funded alternative to reunification where returning a child home was
solutions of problems which may result in, the neglect, abuse, exploitation or delinquency of children ...
preventing the unnecessary separation of children from their families ..." Id at 57-58.
73. Id.
74. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(16).
75. H.R. REP. No. 96-900 (1980). This requirement was to be achieved by periodic administrative or
court review which was intended to "determine the continuing necessity for and appropriateness of place-
ment," and to project a "likely date by which the child may be returned to the home or placed for adoption."
Id
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See 42 U.S.C. § 601.
79. 42 U.S.C. § 673(c)(2).
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not appropriate.80 In doing so, Congress articulated at least a minimal stan-
dard for the care of children that went beyond the 1961 Act's provision for
financial support and shelter. Second, the adoption provision illustrated the
beginning of a legislative acceptance that some families could not be re-
united, and that children should not have to forfeit precious years of their
childhood in the interest of serving the family preservation ideal.
C. Failures of the 1980 Act
The 1980 Act sought to arrest the profuse flow of children into the
system by more carefully monitoring a child's entrance into foster care and
by more rigorously planning a way out. This approach was what the legisla-
ture called an "open-ended adoption assistance program and a closed-end
foster care program ...., Yet, despite the Act's commendable foresight, it
failed at two levels. First, it failed to meet the projected goals of avoiding
foster care placement and facilitating return after placement.82 Second, it
failed at a level of aspiration not yet envisioned by policy makers. That is,
in order to succeed at its goal of propelling children out of the state of foster
care limbo, Congress would have had to express more sharply defined goals
for our national expectation of the future of children in foster care. A goal
that made permanence primary over reunification had not yet been articu-
lated in the 1980 Act, nor did experts hold up such a goal as being the one to
which our foster care policies should aspire.83 Instead, experts and legisla-
80. The reasonable efforts provision required that state agencies offer significant services with the object
of assuring family preservation before removal. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15). Further, the Act provided that similar
effort be made after removal toward the goal of reunification. In this way, the mechanics of the Act state a
preference for maintaining the integrity of the family. Other key aspects of the law, however, take the stand
that permanency is the primary goal. For example, the Act's requirement that a dispositional hearing be held
after eighteen months to determine the child's future status was designed as a safeguard to assure that children
do not remain in foster care indefinitely. The adoption provision, then, can be seen as a fail-safe mechanism,
designed to operate only after the family preservation ideal failed. Despite the visionary quality of this provi-
sion, it failed to provide the additional layer of safety Congress intended because judges were generally still
reluctant to terminate parental rights.
81. S. REP. No. 96-336 at 11 (1979).
82. See Adoption Promotion Act of 1997: Hearing on HR-867 Before the Subcommittee on Human Re-
sources, House Ways and Means Committee, 105th Cong. [hereinafter Adoption Promotion Act Hearings]
(1997). According to the record, "nearly 500,000 children resided in foster care" as of the date of the hearing,
most spending up to three years. The number of children in foster care had increased by eighty-nine percent
since 1982-two years after the passage of the 1980 Act. See also, supra note 72. "The percentage of chil-
dren who exit foster care through adoption has decreased. While adoption was the permanency goal for fifteen
percent of foster care children in 1990, only eight percent of the children who left foster care in 1990 were
adopted. In addition, the median age of children in foster care has dropped to 8.6 years in 1990 from 12.6
years at the end of 1982." Id.
83. Id. ("[T]his bill represents a philosophical shift from the federal policy that makes every effort to
reunite children with their biological families to one that defines when reasonable efforts shall not be made
and when those children shall be placed in permanent, loving adoptive homes.").
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tors claimed family preservation and reunification as the stated goals of the
1980 Act.
The 1980 Act reflected what had been a cultural entrenchment 4 in
the idea of family preservation, so that saving children, in terms of the 1980
law, meant making their homes livable or returnable. 85 Although a provision
for adoption assistance did indeed exist through the Act's adoption assis-
tance mechanism, courts and agency workers were still reluctant to terminate
parental rights.86 Ironically, one of the main features of the 1980 Act-the
requirement that agencies make reasonable efforts before removing a child,
and if removed, to make the same reasonable efforts to return the child as
quickly as possible-eventually had the effect of frustrating the 1980 Act's
purpose.
Among the specific failures of achieving permanency caused by the
reasonable efforts requirement, the most profound were those related to the
timing of the requirement to use reasonable efforts. For example, the re-
quirement that agencies use reasonable efforts in state parental termination
statutes prior to removal often had the effect of acting "as a condition prece-
dent to removing the child from the parental home."87 Courts could refuse to
remove a child where it was determined that reasonable efforts were not
made to restore the family. Because the 1980 Act merely provided incen-
tives for states to make reasonable efforts, it clearly was not intended to act
as a stalling device for removing children from harms way. However, the
use of the reasonable efforts requirement to defer removal was a way in
which judges and agency workers could avoid making the difficult removal
decision. On the other end of the timing spectrum, after removal had already
occurred, agencies and courts could refuse to terminate parental rights be-
cause of a failure on the agency's part to show that reasonable efforts had
been made, thereby assuring that a child would languish in a temporary care
situation.88 At this point in the process, since children were safely tucked
away in temporary care, judges were more likely to rigorously scrutinize the
reasonable efforts requirement because overt harm was not the issue at this
84. Encouraging Adoption Hearing, supra note 52. (Statement of Mark V. Nadel, Associate Director,
Income Security Issues, Health, Education, and Human Services Division, U.S. General Accounting Office).
"Initiatives are not self-implementing and often require a cultural change... in the way that decision makers
view the termination of parental rights."
85. Id. ("The 1980 Child Welfare Act clearly made the priority reunification of families.").
86. Id. (Statement of Mark V. Nadel, Associate Director, Income Security Issues, Health, Education, and
Human Services Division, U.S. General Accounting Office) ("Many caseworkers saw termination as a failure
on their part .... As a result, they seldom pursued termination and instead kept the children in foster care for
longer periods.").
87. Inclusion, supra note 2, at 155.
88. Id. at 157.
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point. 89 The result was to keep children in their temporary situation longer,
without the hope of a plan for permanency. 90
Much of the hesitancy in pushing for permanency at either the initial
removal stage, or at the point where return was being contemplated, resulted
from systemic ignorance about the developmental effects on children in
long-term foster care. 9' This part of the problem with the 1980 Act was less
a failure than a lack of awareness. The cultural climate was perhaps less
sensitive to the subtle harms of a situation that may not have been abusive,
but was nonetheless not conducive to healthy childhood development. 92 The
harms to children in long-term foster care, later articulated by child experts,
included such intangible injuries to children's psyche as "loyalty conflicts,
identity problems, and difficulty in making emotional commitments to their
caretaker . . . ."9 Certainly, the national consciousness had not yet appre-
hended such psychological maladies in our adult population in the years dur-
ing the preparation and passage of the 1980 Act, let alone considered how
such harms would affect children.
In addition to the timing problems related to the reasonable efforts
requirement, there was a considerable amount of inconsistency in the appli-
cation of the requirement of reasonable efforts that resulted from the general
ambiguity of the phrase itself. Much congressional weight was packed into
the notion of reasonable efforts because those efforts were supposed to fa-
cilitate preservation or reunification of families. Yet what constituted rea-
sonable, and what exactly were the efforts to be taken, remained undefined
in the text of the 1980 Act. 94 In most cases, reasonable efforts translated to
subsidizing services for families, but often children would languish in tem-
porary placements while such services were given in the hopes of making the
family stable enough for the child to return.95 Often that strategy failed.96
89. Id.
90. David J. Herring, The Adoption and Safe Families Act - Hope and Its Subversion, 34 FAM. L.Q. 329,
334 (2000)(hereinafter Hope andIts Subversion). In addition to the fIse sense that children in temporary care
were safe, was the competing sense that it was "fundamentally unfair to sever a parent/child relationship
without giving parents a fair chance to rehabilitate themselves." While children could be viewed as content,
parents in the termination process were not. Decision-makers were reluctant to act.
91. Encouraging Adoption Hearings, supra note 52. Judges and lawyers "were not sufficiently informed
of the negative effects on children who do not have permanent homes."
92. NEFF, supra note 3 1, at 4-5. "As common place as it seems now, thirty years later, it was ground-
breaking for Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas to declare in 1969 that 'children are persons under our consti-
tution."' We would still have to progress considerably to begin looking at the quality of life for children in
foster care.
93. Inclusion, supra note 2, at 145.
94. See NEFF, supra note 3 1. "[l]n the absence of clear laws or regulations defining reasonable efforts,
there has been considerable confusion about when to bypass or discontinue such efforts, and place a child up
for adoption." 143 CONG. REC. H2012, H2022 (April 30, 1997).
95. See Adoption and Safe Families Act of1997: 143 Cong. Rec. S12,668, 105th Cong. (1997). (Com-
ments of Senator DeWine, Presiding Officer). "The reasonable efforts provision has "tragically ... been
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By the time Congress was considering the 1997 Act (ASFA), many
realized that something more specific would need to be attached to the rea-
sonable efforts language in order for it to be effective. 97  The absence of
more clearly defined requirements concerning reasonable efforts in the 1980
Act may suggest that legislators avoided directing states specifically as to
what such reasonable efforts should be in an effort to respect traditional be-
liefs that "child welfare matters [are] to be governed primarily by state
law.",98 Some inferences of Congress's reluctance to meddle into state inter-
pretations of ASFA can be drawn from what the Act does not state. First,
the text of the statute fails to clarify the requirement. Second, the Depart-
ment of Human Services addressed the issue of defining reasonable efforts in
a proposed regulation published prior to the passage of the 1980 Act, 99 how-
ever no such regulation was ever issued."' ° Finally, the subsequent 1997 Act
defines reasonable efforts only in the negative.'0 ' That is, ASFA states when
reasonable efforts should cease in favor of adoption and also when reason-
able efforts should not be pursued, but ASFA never affirmatively asserts or
clarifies what reasonable efforts are.
10 2
Other problems with the 1980 Act can be viewed as resulting more
from structural constraints than from ambiguity. One main structural prob-
lem was that the 1980 Act offered matching funding to children in foster
care only where reasonable efforts were made."0 3 Thus, the "consequence of
a finding that a state agency failed to make reasonable efforts is a loss of
federal funds for foster care expenditures."' 0' 4 Because legislators and judges
were aware that such a loss in funding would break down the child welfare
system, they were reluctant to "enforce the federal reasonable efforts re-
seriously misinterpreted by those responsible for administering our foster care system. Too often reasonable
efforts become unreasonable efforts."
96. Id. "[Flederal statutes now put too much emphasis on providing all kinds of services to rehabilitate
troubled families... iftheir family has problems, government should reach out a hand. But not ten hands."
97. Encouraging Adoption Hearings, supra note 52. (Statement of Congressman Clay Shaw, Chairman
on the Subcommittee on Human Resources, Committee on Ways and Means). "I think it is very difficult to
legislate reasonable efforts... it would be probably be more sensible to ask HHS to develop guidelines."
98. Hope and Its Subversion, supra note 90, at 331.
99. Implementing the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, 45 Fed. Reg. 83,172 (December 17,
1980). The proposed regulations were intended to define "reasonable efforts."
100. See H.R. REP. No. 105-77 on H.R. 867, "Adoption Promotion Act of 1997," April 28, 1997. "Final
regulations have [not] been issued to clarify what steps a state or a court has to take to satisfy the requirement
that reasonable efforts to reunify families [were] made."
101. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D). "[R]easonable efforts ... shall not be required to be made with re-
spect to a parent [who] . . . has subjected the child to aggravated circumstances," or where the parent has
"committed murder... voluntary manslaughter or aided or abetted therewith," where the parent has "commit-
ted a felony assault that results in serious bodily injury to the child," or where "the parental fights of the parent
to a sibling have been terminated involuntarily."
102. Id.
103. See 42 U.S.C. § 673(b).
104. Inclusion, supra note 2, at 154.
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quirement meaningfully." ' Another problem in the way the law was struc-
tured was the case review requirement. Since judges and actors within the
system had no incentive to jeopardize foster care funding through a finding
of non-compliance, the case review system was reduced to "a mere produc-
tion line . . . achiev[ing] only paperwork conformity with federal law."1 6
Additionally, agencies and courts were overburdened, lacking the resources
to make planning for permanency as required by the statute's case review
system. Instead, they "developed 'form' court reports and court orders ...
,, 107 Without rigorous application of the reasonable efforts requirement, and
without the firm scrutiny of individual placements offered to children
through the case review system, the Act became a hollow representation of a
barely formed ideal.
III. THE ADOPTION AND SAFE FAMILIES ACT OF 1997:
CHILD SAFETY AND ADOPTION
By the time lawmakers were considering the 1997 Act (ASFA), pol-
icy affecting child placement in foster care was progressing with an evolving
social consciousness about the needs of children, and the effects of the losses
of childhood on society at large.1"8 Increasingly, social expectations of the
quality of an acceptable childhood experience became refined, perhaps in-
corporating some of the broader ideals of personal and societal fulfillment
that arose from the previous decade's interest in self-help, and perhaps re-
sulting as a backlash against the earlier me-centered era. The late 1980's
through the late 1990's saw a society reflecting on its collective spiritual
deficits caused by an increasing focus on material wealth, and also saw the
rise in our cultural desire to break down stereotypes by curing inequality
from the inside out, rather than merely offering subsidies or empty programs.
"Political correctness," although later becoming the source of much debate
and mockery,0 9 allowed us as a society to become sensitized to a variety of
105. Id.
106. Hope and Its Subversion, supra note 90, at 334.
107. Id. at 335.
108. Inclusion, supra note 2, at 144.
[E]ach time a child is separated attachments may be broken generating insecurity and an
inability to form future attachments... [and] may permanently impair a child's ability
to form love relationships. [S]ubjecting children to multiple placements destroys conti-
nuities that are important to the child's development ... a child left in foster care with-
out a permanent home may be psychologically damaged by her uncertain status.
See also 143 CONG. REC. S12,688, S12,672 (Nov. 13, 1997) (Permanency "gives kids confidence to grow into
positive contributors to our society.").
109. See Kenneth Lasson, Political Correctness Askew: Excesses in the Pursuit of Minds and Manners, 63
TENN. L. REv. 689, 689 (1996). "With the fullness of time, when all has been said and done ... what has
come to be called 'Political Correctness' will be revealed as little more than passionate folly - merely another
skirmish in the eternal battle for the minds, hearts and souls of humankind."
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social problems including racial, gender and physical barriers."' Along with
a new desire to bring into the open some of society's otherwise closeted is-
sues, foster care could finally be studied as a symptom of the greater social
ills that plagued our country.
ASFA captured a legislative awareness that damaged childhood ex-
periences could not help but to produce unproductive citizens."' Supporters
of reforming the 1980 Act wanted to enunciate policy for children in foster
care that supported a "common vision of a world in which each person has a
sense of worth; accepts responsibility for self, family, community, and socie-
tal well-being; and has the capacity to be productive, and to help create nur-
turing families, responsive institutions, and healthy communities." '12  The
goals here went far beyond placement; they extended to supporting a foster
care policy that would contribute to raising healthy productive adults." 3
More importantly, the new goals recognized that a stable and supportive pa-
rental relationship was an essential factor in the equation of raising healthy
children." 4 Certainly, the state of the national psyche, with its growing trend
toward self-examination, permitted the legislative revelation that healthy
children make healthy adults. Another important catalyst to the changes
intended for foster care in ASFA was a new emphasis on "accountability,""' 5
and "family values." ' 1 6  Lawmakers attempted to translate these new con-
cerns for accountability into effective policy for foster care children by fo-
cusing on a national responsibility." 7
110. Id. at 692. (Political correctness is a concept, "usually aimed at 'raising consciousness about parts of
our vocabulary that are saturated with implicit racism and sexism."')
111. Encouraging Adoption Hearings, supra note 52. "At issue here is America's future. We are failing
our children if we do not provide them with positive role models."
112. Id. at 31. (Statement of Valora Washington, Program Director, Families for Kids Initiative, W.K.
Kellog Foundation, Battle Creek, Michigan).
113. Id. "[A]II we can do is hope the best that we can that we have facilitated in taking children out of
harm's way into loving homes and thereby making a stronger and more productive country as these youngsters
grow up to be productive."
114. As Senator DeWine noted:
New research tells us that the first years of life are critical to a child's development...
Science is revealing ...that early life experiences help determine the way a child
thinks, learns and behaves for the rest of his or her life. That is why it is so critical for
parents and care givers to raise children in a healthy, happy environment.
Pub. L. No. 105-89 Debate, (House concurrence in the Senate amendment to H.R. 867, comments of Senator
DeWine) Nov. 13, 1997.
115. Encouraging Adoption Hearings, supra note 52, at 30. "[In attempting to reduce the time a child
spends in foster care] we have tried to focus on accountability."
116. See Robin R. Cockey and Deborah A. Jeon, The Family and Medical Leave Act at Work.- Getting
Employers to Value Families, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 225, 228 n. 10 (1996) (citing STEPHANIE COONTZ,
THE WAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERICAN FAMILIES AND THE NOSTALGIA TRAP 94 (1992)). In 1998, Good
Housekeeping magazine claimed that the emphasis on family [in the late 1980's and early 1990's] was "the
biggest social movement since the 1960's," and was a "move toward the home and the family and traditional
values." The media heralded the 1990's as "the Decade of Decency."
117. 143 CONG. REc. S12,688, S12,671 (Nov. 13, 1997) (House concurrence in the Senate amendment to
H.R. 867, comments of Senator Rockefeller). "If American child welfare policy does not succeed in providing
Journal of Legislation
ASFA, would, therefore, need to make a grand departure from the
1980 model if it had any hope of improving the black hole of foster care.
Because foster care policy was only given any real structure with the 1980
Act, such a departure needed to encompass all of the architecture of the law
that had come before, keeping the framework for case reviews for example,
but then the law needed to forge ahead by constructing a vision that was con-
sonant with growing awareness of children's needs. The central ideal of the
1980 Act-permanency-survived because it provided a child-centered
framework. However, permanency was no longer expected to be achieved
solely through family preservation. Experts' awareness" 8 of childhood de-
velopment had simply transcended our national reflexive desire to honor
biology." 9 Instead, legislators focused on the irreparable harms caused by
extended stays in foster care and the potential horrors caused by failing to
accept that some families could not be fixed, and that in some cases, no ef-
forts were reasonable. 120
A. Refining Federal Foster Care Policy: Goals and Mechanics
of the 1997 Act (ASFA)
Whereas the 1980 Act simply formulated a policy where one had not
previously existed, the 1997 Act (ASFA) took a position against much of the
practices that first shaped foster care reform. Thus, the major operational
goals of ASFA where aimed at correcting specific failures of the 1980 Act.'
2 1
Congress addressed three major concerns. First, Congress attempted to rem-
edy the concern that unreasonable efforts were being expended to preserve
or reunify hopeless families. 122 A number of high profile cases where chil-
dren were either kept in, or returned to abusive homes only to be severely
injured or murdered contributed to the legislative conviction that family
a real sense of belonging and identity to children living in the foster care system, we will be denying these
young people the fundamental supports they need to become satisfied and caring adults."
118. 143 CONG. REC. S12,688, S12,672 (Nov. 13, 1997). "A happy, permanent home life provides more
than just a safe haven for kids; it gives kids confidence to grow into positive contributors to our society."
119. 143 CoNG. REC. S12,198, S12,199 (Nov. 8, 1997). "While [this legislation] appropriately preserves
current Federal requirements to reunify families when that is best for the child and family, it does not require
the states to use 'reasonable efforts' to reunify families that have been irreparably broken." Unfortunately,
many "efforts by the State [focus on] reunit[ing] [children] with biological parents who have abused or ne-
glected them." See also, supra note 75. "H.R. 867 places the safety and well-being of children above the
efforts by states to reunite them with biological parents who have abused or neglected them."
120. 143 CONG. REC. H2012, H2017 (April 30, 1997). "[R]easonable efforts are unreasonable efforts...
when a child has been abandoned... [or] tortured."
121. Id. at H2013. "[T]oo often a foster child's best interests are abandoned while courts and welfare
agencies drag their feet. To correct this injustice, H.R. 867 places the safety and well-being of children above
efforts by the State to reunite them with biological parents who have abused or neglected them."
122. See Robert M. Gordon, Drifting Through Byzantium: The Promise and Failure of the Adoption and
Safe Families Act of 1997, 83 MINN. L. REV. 637, 646-48 (1999).
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preservation was not always the ideal. 123 This was a profound and bold shift.
This specific provision clarifies the reasonable efforts requirement by first
stating that "the child's health and safety shall be the paramount concern,"
and by providing that under certain "aggravated circumstances," such as in
cases of abandonment, torture, sexual abuse, or when a parent has committed
murder, reasonable efforts "shall not be required to be made."' 24 This part of
the statute aims at dismantling the family preservation ideal that had plagued
so many judges and agency workers where their allegiance to parental
autonomy posed such a threat to children.125
The next important change is aimed at reducing the phenomenon
known as "foster care drift." '12 6 Three significant features were added to the
law in order to promote moving children out of foster care more swiftly.
First, where it is determined that reasonable efforts are not appropriate be-
cause of "aggravating circumstances," the state must hold a "permanency
hearing" within thirty days in order to find permanent placement.'27 Signifi-
cantly, the language of the hearing requirement has also changed, suggesting
the focus in the new law. Permanency hearings, once termed dispositional
hearings, no longer accepted the idea of reporting a child's status. Instead,
they are intended to require agency personnel to present a plan that contem-
plates a long-term situation. Additionally, "ASFA sanctions concurrent
planning making efforts to reunify the family concurrently with efforts to
find an alterative home for the child.' 128 The purpose of this provision is to
make a back-up plan for children in the event that a parent's conduct be-
comes inappropriate during the reunification process.
Another provision aimed at reducing foster care drift is the require-
ment that states move to terminate parental rights, unless an exception ap-
plies, 129 after a child has spent fifteen of twenty-two months in foster care.
130
This provision seeks to create a fixed time limit for children waiting in limbo
for their parents to rehabilitate,' 3' and reflects the concern that after the lib-
123. Shannon DeRouselle, Welfare Reform and the Administration for Children's Services: Subjecting
Children and Families to Poverty and Then Punishing Them for It, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 403,
419 n.1 10 (1999). The author cites the much-publicized case of Elisa Izquierdo, a six-year-old child who was
abused for months before finally being killed by her mother despite the fact that child welfare officials "had
received many reports."
124. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15).
125. Encouraging Adoption Hearings, supra note 52. "[W]e must ... be willing to terminate parental
rights and move expeditiously toward adoption. So the big thing this bill does is to push the pendulum of
government concern back in the direction of children."
126. Inclusion, supra note 2, at 158.
127. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(C),(D).
128. NEFF, supra note 31, at 15.
129. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E)(i)-(iii).
130. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E).
131. 143 CONG. REC. S12,688 (Nov. 13, 1997). (House concurrence in the Senate amendment to H.R.
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eral application of the reasonable efforts requirement in the 1980 Act there
was "no national consensus on the maximum time children should spend in
foster care.'
13 2
Finally, the 1997 Act (ASFA) brings the adoption incentive provi-
sion to the forefront of the law. Where the adoption provision was almost a
silent fail-safe in the 1980 law because of the Act's commitment to family
preservation, it became part of a public campaign in ASFA. 133 Adoption is
also a crucial feature to ASFA because it provides a means to facilitate the
new intolerance of parental failure. By deciding to give up on parents in the
hopes of saving children, Congress was aware that some other mechanism,
besides reunification, would have to propel children out of the foster care
machine. The adoption incentive provision of ASFA offers a bonus to states
for each child adopted above a predetermined baseline.134  Because states
receive incentives for moving children out of foster care, this provision ad-
dresses the problem of agency inaction created by the prior law where fund-
ing was only received for children who were already in the foster care sys-
tem. In addition to state incentives, the provision for subsidizing the adop-
tion of children determined to have special needs continues from the 1980
Act. 1
Other measures aimed at more effective agency practices can be
found in the recently adopted rules for ASFA. These rules supported a
change in approach from the 1980 Act's withdraw of funds for noncompli-
ance to an initiative for revamping case review procedures that would put
less emphasis on paper work and more emphasis on children. Under the
rules, "[r]eviews to assure eligibility for Federally-assisted foster care [do]
not address conformity with key requirements, but ... assist States in im-
proving their systems, thereby enhancing their capacity to serve children
needing foster care placements. '3 By focusing on "substantial conformity"
rather than "total compliance," the administrator has attempted to move
away from the formality of the paper work that became so mechanistically
executed under the 1980 Act that it precluded true review. 137 Thus, states
867, comments of Senator DeWine).
132. Id. (Recognizing that a child's sense of time is affected by their age, thus for a four year old, two years
in foster care "is half of his or her life.")
133. Proclamation No. 6947 (Oct. 29, 1996). "As a nation we must continue to work to remove obstacles to
adoption, to recruit new adoptive families .... Nothing should stand in the way of providing every boy and
girl in America the permanent, loving home each of them deserves."
134. 42 U.S.C. § 673b(d)(1). "$4,000, multiplied by the amount (if any) by which the number of foster
child adoptions... exceeds the base number," and an additional $2,000 for "special needs adoptions."
135. 42 U.S.C. §§ 670-679.
136. Title IV-E Foster Care Eligibility Reviews and Child and Family Services State Plan Reviews, 63 Fed.
Reg. 50058, 50059 (Sep. 18, 1998); 45 C.F.R. § 1355 (2000).
137. 45 C.F.R. § 1355.32 (2000). "A State [must be] found to be operating in substantial conformity during
(Vol. 29:1
Evolution of Federal Foster Care Funding
will be less concerned with passing their reviews than with participating in
the development of better procedures.
B. Criticisms
Despite the bold efforts of legislators to redefine national goals and
policies affecting children in foster care, scholars have already begun to pro-
ject ASFA's failures.' Among the chief criticisms of the 1997 Act, many
scholars argue that the statute goes too far in the direction away from family
preservation, and claim that adoption is over emphasized, cutting short ef-
forts toward sustaining viable families. 3 9 Specifically, some have criticized
states' incentives claiming they make efforts to fast track adoptions more
appealing and threaten the integrity of genuine family preservation goals. 4 °
Concurrent planning, a major feature of ASFA's adoption emphasis,
suffers from a similar conflict because it is designed specifically to honor
two inherently competing goals. The first goal is for the agency to make
reasonable efforts to preserve the existing biological family; the other is for
the agency to prepare for the failure of those efforts by finding a permanent
home before termination. ' The strength of this provision is that it may sub-
stantially cut the time a child spends in foster care after termination. The
obvious flaw is that concurrent planning constrains the efforts of agency
workers by putting them in "a schizophrenic position."'42
These criticisms are valid considering that ASFA restates the sanc-
tity of families, stating explicitly, "[N]othing in this Act is intended to dis-
rupt the family unnecessarily or to intrude inappropriately into family life, to
prohibit the use of reasonable methods of parental discipline, or to prescribe
a particular method of parenting.' ' 43 Moreover, ASFA has not abandoned
the family preservation model, but merely subordinated it to child safety and
permanency timeline goals. The operative reasonable efforts language still
an initial or subsequent review" in order to receive funding. States found not to be in substantial conformity
will "be required to develop and implement a program improvement plan."(emphasis added).
138. See generally Gordon, supra note 122.
139. See DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS, THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE (2002) (hereinafter
SHATTERED BONDS). "The federal adoption law and rhetoric promoting it weaken the government's commit-
ment to family preservation and establish a preference for adoption as a means of reducing the exploding
foster care population."
140. Id. ("These federal incentives to move children out of foster care steer states in one direction. They
encourage states to. get more children adopted.")
141. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(F) (stating that "reasonable efforts to place a child for adoption or with a
legal guardian may be made concurrently with reasonable efforts... " to preserve and reunify families).
142. SHATTERED BONDS, supra note 139. Roberts argues that "[g]iving agencies the conflicting missions
of reuniting foster children with their families while preparing them for adoption is likely to dilute agency
efforts at family preservation," namely because "offering bonuses for adoption ... weakens even more case-
workers' incentives to keep families together."
143. 42 U.S.C. § 671.
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requires that agencies continue to work toward eliminating a need for re-
moval or reunification unless one of the two ASFA exceptions, either the
existence of aggravating circumstances, or the exhaustion of reasonable ef-
forts, is met.144 Therefore, during foster care proceedings, absent one of
these two conditions, we should still be trying to sustain families.
In order to keep the benefits of adoption in perspective, especially
when adoption threatens family preservation, we should consider that efforts
to promote adoption can, in some ways, be falsely comforting, both to legis-
lators and the public. Adoptions were heavily emphasized during the Clin-
ton administration'45 and offered one of few opportunities to join an increas-
ingly divided Congress in bipartisan legislation.'46 ASFA's legislative his-
tory is often heavily cloaked in "child saving" rhetoric'47 that perhaps over-
shadows some of the more contentious issues between Republicans and De-
mocrats in Congress. Few would argue against a bill that proposed saving
America's children.
The public's wholesale acceptance of the adoption solution suffers
from the assumption that legislators are fully unified, fully informed, and
fully aware of the real implications of changes to foster care laws. Equally,
those who reject the adoption incentive provisions of ASFA as an effort by
Congress to systematically eliminate poor minority families, make argu-
ments that suggest that a single cohesive legislature joined together to con-
sider the potential of the law and designed an outcome beyond an immediate
politically pressing need. "8 In truth, much legislation works like deal mak-
ing with many legislators only briefly informed, and even then, a greater
amount of energy may be spent considering the political impact of aligning
oneself with a given piece of legislation than about the provisions within the
144. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(A), (B) (states that "in making such reasonable efforts, the child's health and
safety shall be the paramount concern; except... [for aggravated circumstances], reasonable efforts shall be
made to preserve and reunify families") (emphasis added). Clearly, aggravated circumstances and the exhaus-
tion of time limits where efforts have been made were the only exceptions to the family preservation model
under ASFA and therefore planning should intend to effect reunification until an exception applies.
145. Proclamation No. 7145, 63 Fed. Reg. 59, 203 (Oct. 29, 1998). "My administration will continue to
support efforts to recruit and strengthen adoptive families and to shorten the time it takes to move children
from foster care to permanent homes ....
146. 143 CONG. REc. H2012, H2017 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997).
147. 143 CONG. REC. H2012 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (statement of Rep. Pryce) ("The bipartisan support
this bill enjoys is clear evidence that building stable fami.lies by promoting adoption is a goal that both politi-
cal parties can and should agree upon." "The most important change we can make is to elevate the rights of
children because too often a foster child's best interests are abandoned while courts and welfare agencies drag
their feet." (emphasis added)).
148. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Is There Justice in Children's Rights?: The Critique of Federal Family
Preservation Policy, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 112, 131 (1999) (hereinafter Justice). "Perhaps the major reason
for preferring extinction of parental ties in foster care is society's centuries-old deprecation of the relationship
between poor parents and their children, especially those who are black."
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law itself. 49 Thus, the criticism here may be better characterized as a lack of
contemplation rather than purposeful policy making designed to affect a sin-
ister outcome.
In addition to the adoption incentives, some have argued that the kin-
ship exception to the requirement for termination after a child has been in
foster care for fifteen of twenty-two months, 5 ' is also squarely at odds with
ASFA's goals of putting the child's health and safety first. 5 ' Specifically,
the exceptions, which allow states not to pursue termination where a child is
in kinship care, and where the agency has failed to make reasonable efforts
conflict with a child's best interests. In the case of kinship care, a child is no
less in need of permanent placement because the temporary caregiver is a
relative. Where the kinship caregiver is willing to adopt, the reluctance to
speed up parental termination frustrates the Act's purpose.'52 This provision
harks back to complaints about the 1980 Act's failures resulting from judi-
cial reluctance to terminate parental rights because children were deemed
safe in their temporary placements. Similarly, when the failure to begin ter-
mination results from a finding that reasonable efforts were not made, the
emphasis is on fairness to parents and not on the best interests of children.'53
To compound the problem of states' refusal to begin termination after fifteen
months where reasonable efforts were not made is the fact that the Act fails
to "address the shortage of parental services" that are necessary to find that
reasonable efforts were made.'54
Another criticism is that ASFA is insensitive to the age differences
in children and thereby "treats different children identically."'55 While an
infant may be greatly harmed by the fifteen-month wait for termination, pro-
ceeding too quickly may harm older children. 156 Because infants have a bet-
ter chance of being adopted than older children, their adoption opportunities
149. See Richard I. Nunez, The Nature of Legislative Intent and the Use of Legislative Documents as
Extrinsic Aids to Statutory Interpretation: A Re-examination, 9 CAL. W. L. REV. 128, 131-35 (1972), re-
printed in LEGISLATIVE LAW AND PROCESS: CASES AND MATERIALS 439 (Otto J. Hetzel, Michael E. Libonati
& Robert F. Williams eds. 2000) (1980). I have imported this argument of what I call the "myth of the unified
legislator" from Nunez's work concerning statutory interpretation. According to Nunez,
[t]he fiction enters when we assume that a legislative body, composed of several hun-
dred individuals, was of a single mind in formulating an intent on a specific segment of
a statute as it applies to a problem that was not anticipated .... Anyone who has ob-
served or participated in the legislative process is aware of the numerous diverse mo-
tives and understandings that produce a final statute.
150. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E).
151. Gordon, supra note 122, at 637.
152. Id. at 659. "[C]hildren do not benefit from failure to pursue adoption when a kinship caregiver wishes
to adopt."
153. See id. at 660 ("Once again, the rule [that is] fair to adults is harmful to children.").
154. Id. at 664.
155. Id. at 667.
156. Id.
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"diminish quickly with age."' 157 Moreover, since infants are also least likely
to be affected by severing biological ties with parents, swifter termination
procedures would better benefit younger children.158 Older children, on the
other hand, are more apt to be attached to parents and may benefit more from
a continued, even if inadequate, relationship with their biological family.5 9
Furthermore, because older children are less likely to be adopted than in-
fants, moving quickly to terminate parental rights only serves to leave these
children in an assured state of continual uncertainty. 160 But despite the unde-
sired effects of the "exception" provisions, they are not fatal to the statute's
success and would require only future refinement so that another provision
would be triggered to guard children's interests in the event that one of the
exceptions was deemed harmful.
IV. PROJECTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: THE FUTURE
OF FOSTER CARE POLICY
Putting the inherent weaknesses of ASFA aside, some have already
begun to take a command from Congress's call to view foster care laws as
"policy making in progress"' 16 ' and have begun to look beyond ASFA.162 One
way to assure that foster care laws evolve along with our national conscious-
ness concerning the needs of children is to remain vigilant in congressional
oversight. Such vigilance should include attempting to harmonize laws that
naturally address overlapping issues. Another way to continue to develop
better ways to care for children in foster care is to stabilize care for children
within the foster care setting when accelerated termination does not assure
adoption.
A. Continued Training: The Strengthening Abuse and Neglect Courts Act
of 2000
Since the passage of the ASFA, and certainly in large part because of
the failures of the 1980 Act, developments in foster care law have begun to
reflect a commitment to constant reexamination. After the 1980 Act, legisla-
tors acknowledged the weaknesses of attempting to cover the whole world of
foster care in one law, and now step more lightly toward attempting to create
157. Gordon, supra note 122, at 667.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. 143 CONG. REC. S12,668, 668-70 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Sen. DeWine) ("[W]e
should make no mistakes about the challenges ahead. We stand only at the very beginning of a long struggle
to save America's children.").
162. See Hope and Its Subversion, supra note 90, at 353.
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a statute that is exhaustive. In keeping with this commitment, Congress
passed the Strengthening Abuse and Neglect Courts Act of 2000 designed to
"improve the administrative efficiency and effectiveness of the Nation's
abuse and neglect courts.. .consistent with the Adoption and Safe Families
Act of 1997. '63 In pressing lawmakers to provide funding to supplement
ASFA through training, courts and child welfare agencies were particularly
concerned with the problems of meeting the shortened timeline requirements
for termination against a growing docket resulting from ASFA's emphasis
on termination and adoption."1
The Strengthening Abuse and Neglect Courts Act of 2000
("SANCA") seeks to achieve efficiency by facilitating ASFA's stringent
timelines in three significant ways: (1) training, (2) tracking, and (3) expan-
sion of the court appointed volunteer program. SANCA aims to reduce case
backlogs by providing funds to states 65 for training "judges, court personnel,
agency attorneys, guardians ad litem, volunteers... and attorneys who repre-
sent children.' 66 In passing SANCA, Congress acknowledged that ASFA's
requirement that termination begin once the family preservation goal in any
case is abandoned acts as an empty directive if not backed up by court re-
sources to process such terminations. 161
While SANCA addresses the need to fortify practical resources for
processing foster care cases, such as the need to extend court hours and to
temporarily hire judges to reduce case loads, SANCA's primary means of
achieving efficiency in moving children in foster care to permanency is
through training for key players in the foster care system, including agency
163. Strengthening Abuse and Neglect Courts Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-314, 114 Stat. 1266 (2000).
164. 146 CONG. REc. H8690-701, H8694 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 2000) (statement of Rep. Johnson) ("Imple-
mentation of ASFA has resulted in an unprecedented sixty-four percent increase in adoptions out of foster care
since 1996. As a direct result of ASFA...new pressures have been put on state courts to hold permanency
hearings, implement permanency plans, make judicial findings, and finalize adoptions ... ").
165. Id. at H8692. The statute authorizes appropriations through 2002 in the amount of $10,000,000 for
making grants to states.
166. Id. at H8690 ("[T]he administrative efficiency and effectiveness of the Nation's abuse and neglect
courts would also be improved by the identification and implementation of projects designed to eliminate the
backlog of abuse and neglect cases ... ").
167. Child Protection Issues: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the House Comm.
On Ways and Means, 106th Cong. (2000) [hereinafter Child Protection Hearings]
The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 ... placed additional responsibilities upon
courts requiring that they take an even more vigilant role in monitoring and handling
child abuse and neglect cases. Additional judicial oversight, shortened timelines, and
increased accountability on the part of the child welfare agencies and courts alike were
required to assure that children were moved to permanency at the earliest possible time.
... Once again a new federal law was passed to guide states in improving court practice
in child abuse and neglect cases. And once again, adequate resources to ensure the
training of every judge handling a dependency docket nationwide were not available.
2002]
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lawyers, 6 ' judges, and court personnel. '69 Proponents of SANCA recognized
a need to achieve uniformity in the application of ASFA guidelines, espe-
cially in light of the harms caused by inconsistencies in the application of the
reasonable efforts requirement associated with the 1980 Act.'70 If the 1980
Act proved anything, it was that more than the articulation of a national pol-
icy would be needed. Instead, progress for children in foster care requires
collective understanding and conformity to unified standards, not so much
on the part of Congress as on the part of the daily actors.''
The second important goal of SANCA is to provide funding for more
effective tracking mechanisms within the courts and in cooperation with
agencies in order to assure that ASFA time requirements for moving toward
termination can be met.'72 Namely, state court administrators have expressed
a need to be able to identify children who have been in foster care for twelve
months or more in order to initiate the permanency planning contemplated
by ASFA.7 In addition to tracking the time a child has spent in foster care,
tracking funds are intended to monitor parental compliance with court orders
and thus allow courts to avoid delay in reevaluating parental fitness, or allow
courts to proceed with termination once unfitness has been established.'
168. Id. (Statement of Mark Hardin, Director, Child Welfare, Center on Children and the Law, ABA.)
Attorneys largely control the flow of information to the judge. When attorneys are un-
aware of vital facts important to the children's safety and treatment ... judges' deci-
sions may well be ill informed or even tragically mistaken .... [Agency attorneys] must
be willing to pursue the difficult and challenging cases and not wait years for them to
become easier because the child has already stayed so long in foster care.
Id.
169. Id. (Statement of David E. Grossman, of the Hamilton County Juvenile Court, Cincinnati, Ohio, for
the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges.)
Judges and court personnel are pivotal and important, [however] they cannot have a
positive impact upon court and practice systems at the grassroots jurisdictional level un-
til resources allow for training .... Judges do not change how they do business unless
they are convinced they need to do so... . No law can 'go on the books' and be effec-
tive unless practitioners understand the intent and spirit of the law, and the expectations
of all parties in carrying out the mandates of the law.
Id.
170. Id.
[JI]udges and other key system players who had not had the benefit of training regarding
the [1980] Act misunderstood the 'reasonable efforts' provision of the Act, thinking that
,reasonable efforts' was synonymous with 'every effort' to return a child home. In spite
of the [1980] Act's intent, children were being returned home to unsafe situations and
being harmed as a result of misconception and lack of understanding as to what the law
intended.
Id.
171. Id. Studies conducted in association with typical practices under the 1980 law indicate that "practices
varied widely from legislation around adherence to time lines .... In fact, fifty-four percent of respondents
indicated that time frames or other statutory guidelines as set by the law were 'loosely adhered to' in actual
practice."
172. Strengthening Abuse and Neglect Courts Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-314, 114 Stat. 1266 (2000).
173. Child Protection Hearings, supra note 167.
174. Id.
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Before SANCA court systems lacked the funds to provide automated inter-
facing of information between courts, law enforcement, and social service
agencies, a necessary step toward satisfying the requirements of processing
cases in the timeframe required by ASFA.175
The final important provision aimed at moving abuse and neglect
cases more efficiently to completion under SANCA is the extension of fund-
ing to expand the court-appointed special advocates ("CASA") program into
underserved communities in order to assure individualized care of each case
in the system.176 CASA volunteers are "citizen volunteers appointed by, the
juvenile and family courts in cases of child abuse, neglect or abandon-
ment.' 77 Because CASA volunteers are dealing with only one or two cases
at a time, unlike caseworkers and judges; therefore, they are able to coordi-
nate the efforts of each participant in a child's case towards resolution.
While SANCA's reach is modest compared to the more ambitious
goals articulated in ASFA, it is significant because it illustrates the impor-
tance of vigilant oversight in child welfare policy, especially related to foster
care where advances can only be made by changes to legislation and not
through case law. Much like ASFA, SANCA is intended to address specific
gaps in an existing law. 178 Unlike ASFA, which came seventeen years after
the first attempt at creating defined goals for children in foster care, and only
after so much had already gone wrong for children under the 1980 law,
SANCA comes just three years after ASFA with the hope of preventing a
future rupture in an already overtaxed system.
B. ASFA and Welfare: The Collision of Poverty and Neglect
The 1961 expansion of welfare benefits to unemployed primary wage
earners and dependent children in foster care was the last time that welfare
and foster care policy operated in concert. The 1980 Act separated the two
related policies. The result of the disharmony between welfare and foster
care is that both laws, rather than having the potential to make powerful and
positive impact on children because of their alignment, now have potentially
175. Id.
176. 146 CONG. REC. H8690-01, H8690 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 2000). "Volunteers who participate in court-
appointed special advocate programs (CASA) play a vital role as the eyes and ears of abuse and neglect courts
in proceedings conducted by, or under the supervision of, such courts and also bring increased public scrutiny
of the abuse and neglect court system."
177. Child Protection Hearings, supra note 167, at 1 (statement of Christine Delay, volunteer Ft. Bend
County Child Advocates Program, Richmond, Texas).
178. 146 CONG. REc. H8690-01, H8693 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 2000) ("While ASFA's accelerated timelines are
essential to promoting stability and permanence for abused and neglected children, these timelines, along with
grossly insufficient funding, have resulted in continued prolonged stays for abused and neglected children in
the foster care system ... ").
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devastating consequences because of their oppositional forces. Because both
ASFA timelines for beginning termination and welfare restrictions for re-
ceiving aid under the Personal Responsibility Act are not coordinated, and
because the majority of children in foster care are from impoverished homes,
the intersection of both laws virtually promises a collision.
Recent changes in welfare laws 17 9 initiated by the 1996 Welfare Re-
form campaign, and resulting in the passage of the Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Act of 1996, ("PRWOA") I8 0 increase the possibility
that more parents will be unable to care for their children and that those chil-
dren will enter foster care because of poverty related neglect such as lack of
adequate housing, food, or child care. 8' Unlike AFDC, which provided an
entitlement to benefits for certain needy families, under PRWOA, aid is now
limited to sixty months, unless within a state's twenty percent allowable ex-
ception, i1 2 and offered conditionally under the Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families ("TANF") block grant.183
The threat to children under welfare reform is fast approaching a
critical state because of the numbers of families expected to fall off of the
welfare roles - those that will reach the theoretical sixty-month maximum
for lifetime benefits allowed under the PRWOA. The numbers are theoretical
and therefore complicated because the federal maximum is a ceiling and not
a floor. States are permitted, and many have, to set lower lifetime limits. 84
Child welfare advocates have thus scurried in attempts to find estimates of
the numbers of families that will be affected by time limits. The best num-
ber is an estimate of approximately 125,000 families who had their assis-
179. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105
(1996). This act combined the Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC") Emergency Assistance and
the Jobs Opportunities and Basic Skills ("JOBS") program into the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
("TANF").
180. Id.
181. See Martin Guggenheim, The Foster Care Dilemma and What to Do About It: Is the Problem That
Too Many Children Are Not Being Adopted out of Foster Care or That Too Many Children are Entering
Foster Care?, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 141, 145 (1999) [hereinafter Foster Care Dilemma] (book review).
"[C]hildren raised in severe poverty plainly need the beneficence of state aid. Unfortunately, the United States
appears to be on a deliberate course to reduce financial support systems for poor families.... [T]he almost
certain trend for the future is an increased use of foster care because it continues as the only remaining source
of government largesse .. "
182. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act, supra note 179.
183. Id. In addition to the time limits, assistance is conditioned upon a recipient's employment within
twenty-four months of receiving benefits. Further, teenage parents must be either living with an adult or
attending a high school or equivalent training program.
184. CLASP State Policy Documentation Project, at http://www.spdp.org/tanf/timelimits/timelim-
itexpl.htm. For example, Connecticut has limits at twenty-one months. Arkansas and Indiana have both set
limits at twenty-four months. Georgia and Florida have limits set at forty-eight months. See also MARK
GREENBERG & STEVE SAVNER, A DETAILED SUMMARY OF KEY PROVISIONS OF THE TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE
FOR NEEDY FAMILIES BLOCK GRANT OF H.R. 3734 (1996). Not all states have elected time limits because the
statute only imposes limits for federal funds. States are permitted to provide funding beyond the federal
maximum.
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tance terminated and another 29,800 whose benefits have been reduced due
to time limits."8 5
The significance of the impact of welfare time limits on children in
foster care is that because ASFA and PRWOA are not coordinated, and both
have strict timelines, children whose parents lose welfare funding will many
times wind up in foster care for conditions which warrant intervention under
the state's abuse and neglect laws. However, the problems necessitating
removal from the home are frequently those primarily related to poverty.1
8 6
Thus, the PRWOA often times unwittingly funnels a child from welfare to
foster care, and then in the interest of permanence, ASFA, which along with
state statutes, makes no distinction between poverty and neglect for the pur-
poses of its reasonable efforts requirement, swiftly terminates parental
rights. 187
Accordingly, a significant goal of future changes to this law should
be to distinguish between failed parenting that cannot be rehabilitated and
poor, but fit parents who need only financial support to provide a loving
home. While few would argue with Congress's desire to unhinge children
from parents whose purposeful behaviors, whatever the reason, cannot be
rehabilitated, the success of this goal rests on a careful analysis that is often
made up of flawed assumptions.
First, parents unable to provide for their children are not necessarily
unfit because they are poor.18  Although poverty is frequently an indicator of
other harmful behaviors, such as substance abuse, 189 absent harm to children
185. Implementation of Welfare Reform Work Requirements and Time Limits: Hearing Before the House
Subcomm. on Human Resources of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of
Mark H. Greenberg, Senior Staff Attorney, Center for Law and Social Policy).
186. DeRouselle, supra note 123, at 418 n.105. According to the author, "[flamilies reported for neglect
are four times more likely to be on public assistance and twice as likely to be black as compared to the general
population." See also SHATTERED BONDS, supra note 139 at 27. Roberts claims "poverty - not the type or
the severity of treatment - is the single most important predictor of placement in foster care."
187. SHATTERED BONDS, supra note 139, at 27 ("[T]he public child welfare system equates poverty with
neglect. State laws in the nineteenth century lumped together 'dependent' and 'neglected' children.").
188. See Sarah Ramsey & Dean Braveman, "Let Them Starve": Government's Obligation to Children in
Poverty, 68 TEMP. L. REv. 1607, 1610 (1995). The notion that the poor are unfit derives from a history of
social welfare reform (traced to the Rehabilitative era of the nineteenth century and originally rooted in the
Elizabethan Poor Laws) that viewed poverty as "a status brought on by loose morals, a lack of thrift and indus-
try, overindulgence in alcohol, and unwillingness to work." Children were moved from their families to
almshouses in order to be reformed of their parent's ways. During this period, and perhaps persisting today,
the dominant belief was that preservation of poor families was an unnecessary goal because "to do so perpetu-
ated and encouraged the very immorality intended to be corrected by the almshouses." See also Martin Gug-
genheim, Somebody's Children: Sustaining the Family's Place in Child Welfare Policy, 113 HARV. L. REV.
1716, 1735 (2000) [hereinafter Somebody's Children). "[E]xperts estimate that forty to seventy percent of
children currently in foster care have not been abused and need not be separated from their families if society
sufficiently assisted poor families in raising their children at home."
189. See Mary O'Flynn, Comment, The Adoption And Safe Families Act of 1997: Changing Child Welfare
Policy Without Addressing Parental Substance Abuse, 16 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 243, 258 (1999).
"Substance abuse by parents has long been recognized as a major reason children enter the foster care system.
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that cannot be remedied by simple funding there is little justification for re-
moving children from their families for lack of income alone. There is evi-
dence that a very definable group of parents who are fit but simply too poor
to provide for their children could benefit from a distinction in the neglect
categorization of child welfare laws. Indeed, one estimate claims that "no
more than ten percent of the children in foster care are there because of seri-
ous abuse" suggesting that the severity of abuse that cannot be rehabilitated
exists along a continuum.9 While it is not clear exactly how many of the
remaining ninety percent of families could be very easily helped with fund-
ing, any number is worth pursuing because if children can remain safely in
loving homes everything we know now about child welfare makes clear that
such a solution is better for children. Thus, attempts at preservation before
termination proceedings begin should be considered rather than rigid adher-
ence to strict timelines that apply to every case. 91
ASFA's time goals address the predicament of children whose fami-
lies cannot be saved and should not be saved, however, the remaining more
questionable cases should be reckoned with to assure outcomes that are best
for children. One of the complicated factors in deciding when to pursue
preservation is the tangled relationship between poverty and neglect in child
welfare law. Most legal definitions characterize neglect as volitional. Thus,
neglect is said to exist when parents are not caring for their children "in
ways that are clearly within their control. 1 92 Consequently, most child wel-
fare experts agree that "[d]efining neglect as an omission within the parents'
control means that poverty alone is not a sufficient criterion of neglect unless
parents choose to be impoverished."' 93 Poverty, on the other hand, has been
defined as "an absolute lack of money based on calculations of what a family
needs to subsist.' 94 Taken together, these definitions make it clear that pov-
erty is not neglect unless other harmful behavior occurs with it. Many state
190. Somebody's Children, supra note 188, at 1724-25.
[T]he current foster care population may be grouped into three categories. First, the
most serious category, constituting about ten percent of current caseloads .... The sec-
ond group encompasses serious cases that do not require criminal justice intervention.
The final group of cases is those in which a child is at a relatively lower risk of serious
harm, and the parents may be willing to work with an agency .... Together, the latter
two groups comprise ninety percent of the caseload.
The author cites examples of the abuse and neglect falling into these lesser categories as "a single, minor
injury such as a bruise or scratch," or less severe still, cases in which dirty clothes, a dirty home or lack of
supervision is the problem. Id.
191. Foster Care Dilemma, supra note 181. See also Justice, supra note 148, at 118; Somebody's Children,
supra note 188, at 1735.
192. RICHARD BOURNE & ELI H. NEWBERGER, CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CHILD ABUSE 4 (1979).
193. Id.
194. Dean Braveman & Sarah Ramsey, When Welfare Ends: Removing Children from the Home for Pov-
erty Alone, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 447, 461 (1997).
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statutes formally recognize the distinction between poverty and neglect yet
give the distinction no meaning because state statutes impose a minimum of
care that must be established for children that overrides the question of fault
or cause.'95 Therefore, since current policy does not distinguish between
poverty and neglect, abysmal conditions of poverty, without an available
exception, often warrant removal.
Rather than permitting poverty to be captured in the category of ne-
glect, a neglect inquiry would serve children better if it rested upon fitness
and ultimate childhood wellbeing. 196 By making parental fitness the primary
concern, we are better able to separate out those cases where a continued
subsidy would allow a family to remain together from those hopeless cases
envisioned by Congress under ASFA. Providing funding to preserve func-
tioning but poor families is also consistent with the best interests of the child
standard because preservation in these cases offers children the necessary
components for stability, namely permanence, so honored by the foster care
funding laws from their beginning. Since the 1970's, with the expanding
awareness of the immediacy of children's needs, most jurisdictions have
applied the best interests of the child standard in child welfare cases. 97 Yet,
in the case of poor but otherwise fit parents, best interest inquiries are often
usurped by personal responsibility rhetoric. Since the best interests standard
dominates child welfare law, it makes sense that this standard should equally
mandate the extension of benefits when doing so is better for children.
Focusing on fitness is also consistent with constitutional limits on
the state's intrusion into family matters. In abuse and neglect cases, the
scope of the inquiry is not whether better parents can be found. If this were
the case, "[t]he welfare of many children might be served by taking them
from their homes and placing them in what the officials consider a better
home."' 98 Instead, the emphasis must be on whether preserving a family will
come to harm children.
195. DeRouselle, supra note 123. The association with poverty and neglect persists in determining when
children are placed in foster care despite state statutes, which require an element of willfulness in a finding of
neglect. See, e.g., under New Jersey's Abuse and Neglect statute, N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c), a child is neglected if
the "child's parent fails to exercise a minimum degree of care... though financially able to do so."(emphasis
added). New York makes a similar distinction; however, the author states that because this provision does not
eliminate a need for protecting children in poor families when their parents are unable to care. Thus, "courts
do not interpret [such a provision] as barring a finding of neglect for poverty."
196. MICHAEL WALD, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: A Search for Realistic Stan-
dards, in CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES AND MATERIALS (Robert D. Goldstein, eds. 1999). An alterna-
tive to the "fitness" standard proposed in this paper is one offered by Wald in which the inquiry would be
fixed entirely on "evidence to specific harms to the child." The benefit of this standard is that it remains
focused on the child because it contemplates more severe harms potentially suffered in foster care or from
termination itself.
197. See, supra note 39.
198. In re Adoption of R.I., 361 A.2d 294, 298 (Pa. 1976) ("A child cannot be declared 'neglected' merely
2002]
Journal of Legislation
Moreover, the United States Constitution protects the "freedom of a
parent and a child to maintain, cultivate, and mold their ongoing relation-
ship."' 99 Although this right is not absolute, its denial can only be based
upon a compelling interest. 200 Because the cost of funding children in foster
care, both in services under the reasonable efforts requirement and adoption
incentives to states and post-adoptive parents, is substantially more expen-
sive than welfare payments,20' it cannot be argued that the interest is compel-
ling when a less costly and less detrimental alternative exists.
Additionally, with much of the pressure for welfare reform resulting
from the outcry of taxpayers, an exception for continuing funds to parents
for children who would face foster care could easily be justified as more
economically responsible. While it could easily be argued that a continua-
tion of TANF benefits runs counter to the philosophical and political tenor of
personal responsibility advocated for under welfare reform, denying children
the right to safe and loving homes because of poverty is equally opposed to
the best interests ideal. Moreover, making a distinction for poverty related
neglect in the case of fit parents would not create an additional expense. The
government already pays to sustain children from desperately poor families
in foster care and after adoption, but the government does so at a substan-
tially higher cost, and often with tragic results.
Unlike economic costs, other costs cannot be measured but can be
easily imagined. When childhood fails children, children fail society. Ulti-
mately, we pay to subsidize families, either directly before too much damage
is done, or indirectly through the inefficiencies of foster care costs and later
into adulthood, when children grow to perpetuate the harms put upon them.
Nothing in the legislative histories of either law reveals an intention to create
such an effect. Instead, the absence of any reference between foster care and
welfare in either the text of the law or the history of the legislation suggests
indifference.2"2
Accordingly, Congress should devote the resources necessary to de-
fine what has become known as poverty-related neglect, and more impor-
tantly to determine the population that is affected. Once defined, both ASFA
because his condition might be improved by changing his parents.").
199. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
200. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
201. SHATTERED BONDS, supra note 139, at 27. According to Dorothy Roberts, "The median monthly
TANF benefit is only about half of the median foster home maintenance stipend. In California, in 1996, the
monthly stipend for two children aged eight and sixteen totaled $859, whereas AFDC benefits for the same
children were only $479."
202. Braveman & Ramsey, supra note 194, at 448 ("Congressional rhetoric [in welfare reform] acknowl-
edged the potential harm of welfare benefit reductions to children... focused on job training for adults as the
solution. For the most part... the question of what will happen to children of parents who lose, or are not
eligible for benefits, was ignored.").
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and TANF provisions could be coordinated and a separate category could be
created under both laws that would untangle the notion of poverty from the
legal definition of neglect. This solution would allow for a continuation of
TANF benefits for the sole purpose of preserving fit homes and avoiding the
trigger of removal and termination under ASFA's timelines.
Another flawed assumption under ASFA is that a child automatically
benefits from parental termination. Without a waiting and loving adoptive
family, termination can do more harm than good. Even if we reject the esti-
mate that the potential for preservation is as high as ninety percent - be-
cause that number includes all children not placed for severe abuse and
therefore may include a group still significantly at risk - a more conserva-
tive account of the numbers of children removed for neglect that can be
remedied is worth exploring. This is especially true because a mistake in the
decision to terminate could subject a child to years of foster care placements
with more potential harm than the grounds that warranted removal.2"3
Furthermore, the adoption goal has not met Congress's highest hopes
because more children are freed for adoption than can be adopted.2" When
parental rights are terminated but children are not adopted, those children
will be assured the very lack of continuity (multiple and lengthy foster care
stays) that ASFA was designed to prevent. This flaw in the law can be ame-
liorated by the poverty and neglect distinction suggested above. This sepa-
rate categorization will assure that children will not be inappropriately re-
moved. Additionally, efforts to stabilize foster care will assure that place-
ment and termination in the absence of waiting adoptive parents can mirror a
more ideal childhood experience.
C. Stabilizing the Foster Care System From Within
Scholars recommend that Congress put efforts into "stabiliz[ing]
temporary foster care placements, [by] establishing a significant degree of
permanency within the foster care system itself."20 5 This could perhaps be
accomplished by devoting funding under SANCA to train foster care parents
to make foster care a more loving and quality childhood experience for those
203. Id.
[T]here is substantial evidence that except in cases involving very seriously harmed
children, we are unable to improve a child's situation through coercive state intervention
.... In fact, under current practice, coercive intervention frequently results in placing a
child in a more detrimental situation than he would be in without intervention.
Id.
204. Id. ("Because many of the children whose family ties are severed won't be adopted, the policy may
actually result in a net increase in the foster care population.").
205. Id.
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children who must be placed. This suggestion is less a criticism of ASFA
and more an attempt at incorporating some of what we have learned as a so-
ciety about children and childhood.
V. CONCLUSION
ASFA makes the necessary departure from the 1980 Act by making
bold declarations that represent a "baseline measurement that we can, as a
humane, caring society, satisfy ourselves that abused and neglected kids are
properly being cared for. 2 °6 This baseline could only have been established
through the rejection of the earlier 1980 law's approach. The 1961 Act pro-
vided no such baseline for which the 1980 Act could respond or reject. De-
spite the significant shift in emphasis from family preservation in the 1980
Act to safety in ASFA, what is most illuminating in Congress's changed per-
spective from one statute to the next is not the changing law, but rather the
acceptance that the law will always be essentially limited to what we know,
or what we are willing to begin to know as a society. Lawmakers were hum-
bled by the failures of the 1980 statute and crafted the 1997 law not with the
hopes of cementing an ideal, but rather of creating a "cornerstone for future
efforts on behalf of abused and neglected children., 207 This Act was not in-
tended to be a final statement but rather one more step in a work in progress.
Thus, ASFA can be most credited with insisting upon leaving an opening for
future reexamination that, through Congress's admitted limitation will al-
ways aspire to the next level of societal expectation. The coming collision
between welfare and foster care laws suggests that it is already time to make
the next step.
206. Encouraging Adoption Hearings, supra note 52, at 94 (Comments of David Leiderman, executive
director of the Child Welfare League of America).
207. See supra note 114, at S12671. (Comments of Senator Rockefeller). "[W]e have crafted the begin-
nings of a solution. It is that ... the beginnings of a solution to this problem." Id. at S12670 (Comments of
Senator DeWine) (emphasis added).
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